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Non technical summary 
 
During the recent financial crisis and with the financial sector under severe strain, euro area banks have 
dramatically tightened credit standards on loans to non-financial corporations between mid-2007 to and 
end-2009. Euro area firms, and especially Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) have reported 
acute problems of access to finance. Access to finance is widely perceived to be a crucial factor for firms 
to maintain their day-to-day business as well as to achieve long-term  investment and growth goals. 
Constrained access to finance crucially may hinder growth, and, as the availability of sources of finance 
deteriorates, pose a major threat to the economy as a whole. 
Using firm-level replies to the ECB-EU SME survey on access to finance between 2009 and 2010, we find 
two ways to identify firms facing financing obstacles: a first approach is to use directly the answer to one 
of the first questions of the survey questionnaire when firms are being asked what is the main problem and 
focusing on those firms who reply “access to finance” while the second approach is to focus on their 
actual experience in seeking external finance. Hence we construct two indicators of financing constraints: 
one based on perceptions and another, based on actually experienced financing constraints. The distinction 
between perceived and actually experienced financing constraints is important. Around half of 
respondents having experienced financing obstacles do not choose “access to finance” as their most 
pressing problem. At the same time, around 10% of firms choose “access to finance” as the most pressing 
problem, but have never actually faced any sort of limitation in accessing external sources of finance. 
We then run a number of probit and multinomial regressions to determine which firms’, sectoral or 
national characteristics have driven both perceptions and experienced financial constraints during the 
recent financial turmoil. We find that perceptions of a financing crunch was broadly based across firms 
but those firms who really experienced a credit crunch tended to be small and young, confirming the fact 
that SMEs tend to suffer more when credit standards are tightened. Some countries of the euro area also 
appear to have suffered significantly more (e.g. Spain) while others were much better off (e.g. France) in 
terms of access to finance. Clearly, looking forward, the panel structure of the survey where individual 
firms can be followed over time will provide a new dimension for research to be pursued.  
  
1.  Introduction 
During the recent financial crisis, euro area firms, and especially Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), have been reporting acute problems of access to finance. With the financial sector under severe 
strain, euro area banks have dramatically tightened credit standards on loans to non-financial corporations 
from mid-2007 to end-2009
1. In January 2009, Mr Andrea Benassi, UEAPME
2 Secretary General was 
stating: “Loans have become more expensive and burdensome, while their availability has sharply 
decreased. SMEs are facing difficulties not only to finance their investments, but also their day-to-day 
operations, in a worryingly increasing number of cases”. At the time, however, little hard data could back 
up this strong argument  and it was hard to quantitatively measure the magnitude of the problem.  If 
anything, the spread between the average interest rates charged on small loans (possibly proxying loans to 
SMEs) and those charged on large loans (i.e. more than 1 million EUR) had widened significantly (see 
Annex I).  
Access to finance is widely perceived to be a crucial factor for firms, and especially SMEs, to maintain 
their day-to-day business as well as to achieve long-term investment and growth goals. With generally 
limited access to capital markets, many euro area firms heavily rely on the banking sector for credit. 
Hence a well-functioning banking sector plays an important role in channelling resources to the best firms 
and investments projects.  Constrained access to finance may crucially  hinder growth, and, as the 
availability of sources of finance deteriorates, pose a major threat to the economy as a whole. 
Recently, and partly because of the recent economic crisis, SME financing has risen in policymakers’ 
agenda and empirical interest in this topic has led to a rich strand of papers. The purpose of this paper is to 
grasp the nature of the financial difficulties met by euro area firms throughout the financial crisis and to 
draw a portrait of euro area firms under financing constraints during the recent crisis. We add to the 
empirical literature in two main ways. First, we use survey data from the new EU-ECB SME Survey on 
access to finance, which proves to be particularly rich to understand how euro area firms assessed their 
access to external finance throughout the recent crisis.  Second, we distinguish between self-reported 
individual firms’ beliefs of financing constraints and actual experience. In particular, we develop two 
indicators of financing constraints: the first indicator is based on an a priori perception and an implicit 
ranking of problems faced by firms; the second one is based on firms’ actual experience in getting access 
to external financing. This can be done by connecting replies from different parts of the questionnaire and 
can help checking the consistency and robustness of determinants of actual financial constraints. We then 
use linear probabilities models and panel data techniques to identify “structural” determinants of “true” 
financing obstacles. 
We find that perceptions of financial crunch was broadly based across firms during the recent financial 
turmoil but those firms who really experienced credit restrictions  tended to be small and young, 
confirming the fact that SMEs tend to suffer more when credit standards are tightened. 
                                                       
1  See Bank Lending Survey reports available on the ECB website: http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html. 
2  The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises  
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature on 
SMEs’  access to finance. Section 3  provides a description of the data and introduces the empirical 
methodology followed. Section 4 describes our results and the last section concludes.  
2.  Related literature 
Given their weight in the economy (i.e. about 60% of value added, 70% of employment and 99% of 
businesses in Europe), SMEs are often considered as a major driver of innovation and employment, and 
thus a potential base for future growth. Recent empirical studies have refined this view, suggesting that the 
entry of new firms – which are mostly small at entry – and the possibility for successful SMEs to grow 
unconstrained is actually the decisive factor for economic growth (e.g Beck et al, 2005; Aghion et al., 
2007). However, SMEs are generally more prone to being constrained and experiencing difficulties in 
accessing bank credit and more broadly, external finance. The body of literature investigating  the 
existence and the determinants of financing constraints is already very large and based on two main 
theoretical considerations: asymmetric information and agency costs.  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), - in their 1988 seminal paper testing the presence of financing constraints -, argued that in the 
presence of asymmetric information, internal and external capital are not perfect substitutes
3. Hence firms’ 
investment may depend on financial factors, such as the availability of internal finance, access to new debt 
or equity finance or the functioning of particular credit markets. A major stream of the empirical literature 
thus started from this assumption that external financing is more costly than relying on internal funds due 
to problems of asymmetric information and agency costs and explored the determinants of financing 
constraints for firms. 
These problems are believed to be more significant for SMEs: first, their smaller size may affect the 
quality and the quantity of information available on their investment project and the quality of collateral. 
Smaller firms are often perceived to be more opaque than larger firms and monitoring costs weight more 
heavily on smaller-scale projects (see Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1989; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1991; 
Beck et al. 2005). Moreover, small firms are often young and have not had time to build up a track record 
and a reputation. Finally, SMEs are much more bank-dependant than larger enterprises. They do not 
normally issue traded securities that are continuously priced in public markets, which would provide 
relevant and more transparent information to potential lenders. For example, Whited and Wu (2006), 
showed, using US data, that financially constrained firms are small, have low analyst coverage and do not 
have a bond rating. 
A number of relevant and recent papers have identified a number of determinants of access to finance: 
Atanasova and Wilson (2004) suggest that firm’s total assets, taken as a proxy of available collateral, is an 
important determinant of bank loan availability. Beck et al. (2006) find that countries with higher levels of 
                                                       
3   Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) questioned  the validity of  Fazzary  et al.’s findings that financially 
constrained firms tend to have high investment-cash flow sensitivity arguing that Fazzari et al.  tends to 
classify firms incorrectly. This stream of the literature, using balance sheet information, needs to a priori 
classify firms between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (using proxies such as the size or the 
age of the firm) in order to check whether the sensitivity of investment/growth to cash-flow is higher for 
constrained than for unconstrained firms Kaplan and Zingales, after re-classification, find substantial 
differences in the degree of investment sensitivity to financial constraints between firms.  
financial intermediary development, more liquid stock market, more efficient legal systems and higher 
GDP-per-capita report lower financing obstacles. Bougheas et al. (2006), using UK manufacturing firms 
from 1989 to 1999, find that several firm-specific characteristics such as size, collateral, riskiness, age and 
profitability were important determinants of access to credit. Evidence has also been found that quoted 
firms face less financing constraints and that foreign-owned firms have easier access to external financing, 
compared with nationally-owned firms (e.g. Harrison and McMillan, 2003). Colluzi et al. (2009) estimate 
the relative importance of a set of firms’ characteristics in explaining the existence of financing obstacles. 
They found that being young or small increases significantly the probability of facing financing obstacles. 
Sectoral differences also appear to be significant with firms in manufacturing and construction facing 
more access to finance issues than in other sectors. Using survey data from 2005 and 2006, Canton et al. 
(2010) investigate the determinants of firms’ perceived financing constraints, focusing on bank loans. 
They found that, at the European Union level, firms’ age plays an important role in that older firms 
perceive external financing as being less difficult. Also, a tighter relationship with banks helps firms to 
perceive an increased availability of credit. Finally, they found significant country differences, partly 
explained by the degree of competition in the banking sector. More recently, Ferrando and Griesshaber 
(2011) use the new survey on access to finance of SMEs from the ECB and the European Commission to 
draw a first attempt at identifying determinants of financing constraints during the recent financial crisis. 
They find that age and ownership structure are crucial determinants of the probability to perceive financial 
constraints, but firm size and sector of economic activity do not matter. Our paper aims at refining this 
analysis by distinguishing between what firms believe and what they actually experience when seeking 
external finance. Moreover, since the analysis is very much conditional in nature, we believe empirical 
tests  must include some form of interaction between some of the possible determinants of financing 
constraints. Hence we improve the empirical analysis further by consolidating the econometric model 
using multiplicative interaction models. This leads to a  slightly  different  and  possibly  more robust 
conclusion.  
3.  Data and methodological approach 
(a) Data characteristics 
Our analysis is based on firm-level data taken from the ECB-European Commission Survey of access to 
finance of SMEs. The main purpose of the survey is to qualify firms’ access to finance in the European 
Union, and most particularly in the euro area. The survey contains a large number of questions on the 
nature and the severity of obstacles  to financing. It also contains some information on firms’ 
characteristics such as type of ownership, employment, age, sector of activity, size of turnover. Compared 
with existing cross-country surveys within Europe (for instance, the Flash Eurobarometer) the ECB-EU 
SME survey displays two novel characteristics: first, its higher frequency ─ since it is run every six 
months; second, it also contains a small set of large companies so that some inferences on financing 
obstacles experienced by SMEs can be made with respect to large firms using the same database. 
Overall, more than 5,000 firms are surveyed, with the number varying across countries. The sampling 
method is performed such as the resulting sample is representative across several dimensions, i.e. for each  
of the biggest euro area countries (i.e. Germany, Spain, France and Italy), across firm size (i.e. micro, 
small, medium and large firms
4) and main industries.  
So far, only three surveys have been run, the first one in July 2009, the second survey round in December 
2009 and the third round in September 2010, all referring to the six months preceding the month in which 
the survey was carried out. Hence all three waves have been carried out at exceptional times of deep 
financial turmoil and economic recession in the euro area. In 2009, euro area GDP growth contracted by 
more than 4% compared with the previous year, driving the euro area in a deep recession. At the same 
time, strained by the financial turmoil, euro area banks tightened their credit standards as never before. 
[Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 reports the composition of the samples for each available wave according to size, ownership and 
other firms’ characteristics for the 5,000 firms responding to the survey questionnaire and some summary 
statistics. By construction, the samples are broadly similar, except for the age variable. In the second half 
of 2009, less than 60% of companies were more than 10 years old and 11%, less than two years old. By 
contrast, in the 2010 wave, almost 80% of firms were reportedly more than 10 years old and the younger 
age group had shrunk to 2%. A main driver of this change in sampling is probably the effect of the 
economic crisis and the low survival rate of younger firms. Assuming that older firms face lower financial 
constraints than younger ones, this change in the age distribution of the two samples could lead to a 
reading of improvement in access to finance when looking at raw tabulations; hence the need to carefully 
model the probability to being financially constrained according to different characteristics. 
Looking at survey replies in details, more than 40% of the firms surveyed used either a bank loan or draw 
from their credit line or bank overdraft (or both) in the six months preceding each survey round. This 
makes bank-based sources of external financing more popular than any other sources (about 30% relied on 
trade credit; 35% on some form of leasing, factoring or hire-purchase – any other sources of external 
financing being much less used).  Throughout the three waves, survey results pointed to a general 
deterioration in the availability of finance perceived by the euro area corporate sector. 
(b) Alternative ways to define financial constraints: belief versus experience  
Based on the questionnaire, there are two ways to identify firms facing financing constraints. A first 
approach in understanding the severity of access to finance issues is given by the answer to one of the first 
questions of the survey questionnaire. Indeed each surveyed firms is asked to identify the most pressing 
problem they are facing at the time of the survey. Each respondent is given a choice of six alternatives to 
select  from:  “finding customers”,  “competition”,  “access to finance”, “costs of production (including 
labour costs)”, “availability of skilled staff” and “regulation”. The respondent is also given the final option 
to choose “other” when none of the previous six answers adequately describes its most urgent concern. 
Our first approach is quite straightforward. We identify a firm as financially constrained whenever it 
chooses “access to finance” as its most pressing problem. Since the beginning of 2009, the most pressing 
problem reported by euro area firms  has clearly been finding  customers, reported by nearly 30% of 
                                                       
4   Micro firms are defined as firms of less than 10 employees. Small firms have between 10 and 49 employees; 
medium firms, between 50 and 249 and large firms, more than 250 employees.  
responding firms. In the 2009 surveys, “access to finance” came second in the implicit ranking of most 
pressing problems, with around 18% of euro area firms stressing it as a pressing issue. At the time of the 
following survey (in 2010), this percentage went down to 15% (see Figure 1a). Whether this decline 
actually reflected an improvement in access to finance cannot be a straight forward interpretation. Indeed, 
as  noticed earlier, the 2010 sample counted less young firms than the 2009 samples. Assuming that 
younger firms are more prone to financing obstacles, as suggested by previous research papers, this 
apparent improvement could only be due to a statistical artefact. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
It is also interesting to report the breakdown of replies by firm size (see Figure 1b). Already, a pattern 
seems to emerge, with the importance of access to finance declining linearly with firm size: access to 
finance was being reported as the most pressing problem by 21% of micro firms, 19% of small firms, 17% 
of medium firms and 12% of large firms, in the second half of 2009.  
One major drawback of focusing on this particular question is that respondents can choose only one reply 
and hence must implicitly rank the seriousness of the problems they are facing. In other words, we do not 
observe the actual levels of financing obstacles within a firm where “access to finance” may well be the 
second or third most pressing problem. Survey results may thus underestimate the existence of firms that 
consider access to finance as a pressing (although not the most pressing) problem. On the one hand, the 
phrasing of the question avoids the danger of bias caused  by possible tendencies of some firms to 
generally give more negative (or positive) assessments. In the survey, firms are forced to put the existence 
of financing constraints in relation to other problems. Therefore, we could assume that their answer is 
more likely to reflect a (very) serious obstacle if chosen by the respondent. On the other hand, the reply 
may be based on the perception of the respondents and is not a priori based on their actual experience. It 
may also be a belief or a general perception.  
Hence, we distinguish an alternative way to identify firms facing financing constraints, solely based on 
their actual experience in applying for a loan or any alternative source of external financing. Respondents 
to the survey are being asked whether they have applied or not for external financing and what their 
success was in accessing this source of funding. One may define an indicator of constrained access to 
finance by simply adding the replies of: 
-  those firms who did not seek external financing because they feared their application would be 
rejected; and 
-  those firms who actually applied for external financing but saw their application rejected; and 
-  those firms who only received a limited part (i.e. less than 75%) of what they applied for; and 
-  those firms who had to refuse the proposal for external financing because the associated costs 
were too high. 
In our analysis, this indicator of constrained access to finance will take value 1 whenever a firm falls into 
any of the categories above and 0 whenever the respondent did not experience any particular problem in 
applying for external financing or did not need to seek external financing (see Annex II for a description  
of main variables). About 25% of firms had experienced one form of constraint in accessing external 
finance according to this definition according to the surveys carried out in 2009 and 19% in the third 
survey wave. Once again, simple plots of this indicator by firm size or age suggests some relationship 
between financing constraints and size or age (see Figure 2). 
[Figure 2 around here] 
The distinction between perceived and actually experienced financing constraints is important.  For 
example, in the second half of 2009, about 20% of firms felt constrained (981 firms exactly) and roughly 
the same number was actually constrained (i.e. 1027; see Table 2). Of those, only half (509) had chosen 
“Access to finance” as their main problem. At the same time, a puzzling 10% of firms (i.e. 327 out of 
3149) reported access to finance as their most pressing problem, but never actually experienced any 
limitation in accessing  external sources of financing.  In  all three available  waves, these proportions 
remained broadly unchanged. 
[Table 2 around here] 
(c) Methodological approach 
As a first step in our analysis, we want to check which indicator is the most relevant to understand what 
the main determinants of financing constraints are. Hence we run a regression analysis in which we relate 
our two indicators of financial obstacles (i.e. the indicator based on perceptions and the one based on 
experience)  to  firms’  characteristics.  Since the explained  variable  is  a  binary  variable  ─ 
experiencing/reporting credit constraints or not ─, we rely on a multivariate probit model, assuming that 
firms’ financial obstacles can be described by the following equation: 
{
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Within this probit framework, it is possible to estimate probabilities of experiencing / reporting financing 
constraints conditional on a vector of explanatory variables i.e.: 
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The regressors that might be driving the occurrence of a positive credit constraint indicator include the age 
of the firm (either in the form of a categorical or continuous variable), its size (i.e. categorical dummies 
based on the number of employees), sectoral and type-of-ownership dummy variables and main country of 
operation. The error term εi,k is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and fixed variance
5. 
In the survey, firms are actually asked for the year in which they were created, so that the variable “age” 
may simply be calculated by taking the difference between the year of the survey and the birth year. 
However, the distribution of the age variable is highly skewed with a third of the sample aged 8 years or 
less and 50% aged less than 15 years. Moreover, some clustering appears in the continuous variable that 
                                                       
5   Results are robust to the alternative logit specification.  
may just be linked to a well-known misreporting problem: a significant number of firms report having 
been created in round years, e.g. 1950 or 1900, which is probably more an approximation than the real 
year in which the firms was founded
6.  Therefore, we test our specification using the (log of the) 
continuous age variable, on the one side, and some categorical dummies, on the other side, which we split 
as follows: less than 5 years, between 5 and 9 years old, 10 to 19 years old, 20 to 49 years old and 50 years 
old and above. This categorisation allows testing for five rather homogenous groups in terms of number of 
observations. Moreover, this enables use to isolate those firms who are less than 5 years old, where the 
survival rate is lower. Indeed only about half of new European firms survive the first five years
7.  
Ownership is defined as a binary dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is one-person only or 
family-owned and 0 if the company is either listed, owned by other firms or business associates or venture 
capital firms or business angels. The idea behind this grouping is to get some meaningful categories as 
family-owned firms are the norm among SMEs and very few firms are actually either listed or venture 
capital firms.  
The survey distinguishes several  sectors of economic activity, from which we extract five grouping: 
mining and manufacturing are grouped together due to the low number of mining and utility firms, 
construction is grouped together with real estate, which comes as quite a natural decision; trade, transport 
and other services make up for the three remaining categories. “Other services” is a very wide category 
gathering a broad range of different activities such as accommodation and food services, information, 
communication, administrative, professional support, social work or entertainment, but excluding public 
services. 
Finally, country is a vector of country dummies that allow us to control for unobserved country-specific 
factors that might drive firms’ responses. Since omitted country characteristics might cause error terms to 
be correlated for firms within countries, we allow for clustered error terms to obtain robust variance 
estimates (see Williams, 2000).  
There are a number of missing variables in firms’ replies. These are simply ignored in the regressions we 
are running. In addition, “don’t know” responses are treated as missing values. 
A note should be made that this analysis is by no means a test of the lending efficiency of banks in 
financing SMEs since the available data offers no way to appropriately judge the quality of the potential 
borrowers (e.g. credit history, debt levels, growth rate, etc). 
[Table 3 around here] 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results of the basic probit regression using experienced credit constraint 
as the dependent variable (specification (1)). A striking result is that firm size does not seem to matter. 
The likelihood to experience credit restrictions  cannot be significantly explained by firm size  and in 
particular, there is no significant difference between large and smaller firms. The company’s sector of 
                                                       
6   Moreover, a number of responding firms do not report their year of creation but only provide an estimated age 
range as the starting point of their operation.   
7   See Bartelsman et al. (2003). 
   
activity does not matter either as sector-specific effects do not significantly influence the likelihood to 
experience problems of accessing external financing. Our ownership variable  does not enter the 
specification either, suggesting that being one-person or family-owned does not make firms particularly 
more prone to experiencing problems of access to finance. Age appears to be a more promising predictor 
of experiencing problems in accessing external finance. A robust predictor is indeed youth: very young 
firms (those below 5 years) are significantly more likely to experience financing problems. Age entered as 
a continuous variable is significant and negative, as expected: the younger the firm, the more likely to 
experience access to finance problems. However the inclusion of age treated as a continuous variable 
modifies the significance of some regressors: in this case, having less than 10 employees and being a one-
person only or family firm significantly helps to predict the likelihood of experiencing  financial 
constraints (specification (2)).  
This brings the attention of the high correlation existing between these three variables. Ownership and age 
are both significantly and highly correlated with firm size: the smaller the firm, the younger and the more 
likely to be one-person or family-owned. The correlation with size is above 0.30 at 1% level of 
significance for both variables. We believe that the empirical analysis should take into account the effect 
of these correlations. Hence, we generate some interaction terms between age and size and between age 
and ownership and include them into specification (3). Since we cannot interpret the coefficients of the 
interaction terms as unconditional or average effects (see Brambor et al, 2006; Greene, 1990, and Norton 
et al. 2004)  we  rely on  model No.3  -  which  includes  interaction terms-  ,  to  compute the average 
probability of predicted values for experiencing financing constraints by size, age or type of ownership. 
Standard errors can be computed using the delta method (see for example, Davidson and McKinnon, 
2004) and are reported together with the average predicted probability in Figure 3. Partial effects may also 
be computed in order to check whether overall trends hold by firm size, for example (see Figure 3(e) and 
(f)). 
[Figure 3 around here] 
Our results clearly show  that there seems to be a linear relationship between experiencing financing 
constraints and firm size or age: the smaller and the younger the firm, the more likely to experience 
financing constraints. However, all categories are not always significantly different from one another. 
Regarding firm size, our overall results suggests that small and micro firms, on the one side, and medium 
and large, on the other side, are not significantly different from one another. The only firm conclusion we 
can draw is that micro and small firms are more likely to experience financing constraints than medium 
and large. The same picture holds for age. Firms of less than 10 years of age are significantly more prone 
to financing constraints than mature firms (i.e. more than 20 years old), but, according to our model, very 
young firms (i.e. less than five years old) are not significantly different from firms aged 5 to 9.  
Our sectoral control  variables  do not bring about any additional  information. Different sectors  of 
economic  activity cannot explain much  and  all  firms  seem  equally likely to encounter problems in 
accessing external finance. What actually seems to be driving most of the explanation when it comes to 
problems of accessing finance are country-specific effects (see Figure 3d), which comes out as strongly 
significant and very robust across all types of specifications. Country-specific effects show an interesting  
hierarchy between countries, with Spain and Italy facing significantly more serious difficulties than 
Germany and, on the other side, French firms significantly better off than German firms.  
The same exercise is also run for our second indicator of financing obstacles, namely the one based on 
perceptions, derived from the question on the most pressing problem for the firm. We can run a basic 
probabilistic model trying to differentiate between those firms who reported access to finance as their 
main problem compared with those who choose another reply. These results are presented in Table 3, 
Column (4) which is a probit model comparable to Model (3), using interactions in order to take into 
account the correlation between variables size, ownership and age.  Models  (3) and (4)  are broadly 
comparable, with country-specific factors and youth being robust determinants of financing obstacles and 
some minor differences in the significance of some  interaction terms. At this point, an important 
consideration to recall is that, given the formulation of the question, companies’ replies to the question are 
not mutually exclusive and a firm may perceive problems of access to finance without reporting it as its 
most crucial issue. Hence, rather than modelling perceptions of financial constraints independently, we 
simultaneously model all replies using a multinomial regression model (model (5) in Table 3) and focus 
our analysis on  coefficients  applying to the probability of replying “access to finance is my main 
problem”, compared with a base outcome set on the most popular reply (i.e. “finding customer”). This 
makes the regression coefficients somewhat tricky to interpret, but the analysis econometrically more 
robust. Model (5) specification provides  interesting results. Once again, firm youth appears to be a 
significant determinant of perceiving constrained access to finance. Younger firms are significantly more 
likely to choose “access to finance” as their most pressing issue over “finding customers” than any other 
firms. Another interesting finding is the significance of country specifics which remains robust: compared 
with Germany, Spain is the country that seems to perceive most problems of access to finance, while 
French firms appear significantly better off. However, when it comes to choosing “access to finance” over 
“finding customers” as the most pressing issue facing the firm, Italy is no longer significantly worse off 
than Germany. 
So far, we have treated perceived and experienced credit constraints independently and at first sight, there 
seems to be little difference between the two indicators that would help us choose between one or the 
other to be the most relevant for the analysis of financing constraints. However, as we have seen in 
Section 2, there is a non negligible proportion of firms that encounter real financing constraints, even 
though they do not report access to finance as their main problem. In order to enrich and wrap up the 
analysis, we construct a variable which will combine our two indicators in the following way. This 
categorical variable “Financing Obstacle”:  
-  will take value 0 if the firm did not perceive any financing obstacles nor experienced it (e.g. 2,822 
firms in the 2009H2 survey round according to Table 2)  
-  will take value 1 if the responding firm perceived financing obstacles, but did not actually 
experienced any (e.g. 327 firms in the 2009H2 survey round according to Table 2); and 
-  value 2 in case the firm actually experienced financing constraints , no matter its perception (e.g. 
1027 firms in the 2009H2 survey round according to Table 2).  
We then run a multinomial regression that models these qualitative categorical responses variables. The 
benefit of using such a model is that it allows us to calculate the odds for perceiving and experiencing 
financing obstacles relative to the most common outcome which is not  perceiving  nor  experiencing 
financing obstacles. Table 4 presents the odds-ratios derived from this model, limiting the output to those 
coefficients that are significant at a 5% level or below. The full model is similar to that of columns 3 and 5 
of Table 3. 
[Table 4 around here] 
According to our results, the odds of actually experiencing financing obstacles are 6.56 greater for very 
young firms (aged less than 5 years old), holding all other variables constant. Similarly, micro firms have 
a higher probability (2.09 higher) to experience financing constraints, all things being equal. Another 
interesting finding relates to the country aspect where the odds of experiencing financing obstacles are 
4.27 greater in smaller euro area countries, holding all other variables constant. 
To facilitate the reading of these odd-ratios, we then use this model to predict the probability of firms to 
fall in each of the three possible outcome categories. Two plots look particularly relevant. Figure 4(a) 
depicts the predicted probabilities of experiencing;  only perceiving financing obstacles or not being 
financially constrained by firm size. Clearly, the model predictions suggest a clearly significant impact of 
firm size on the likelihood to experience financing obstacles (which is not so clear for firms only 
perceiving that financing obstacles): The smaller the firm, the more likely to have actually been through 
difficulties in obtaining external finance. The same conclusion does not hold for those firms who only 
perceived financing constraints but have not really experienced them, e.g for a medium-sized firm the 
probability to perceive financing constraints is higher than for a small firm. A similar relationship emerges 
when looking at firm age (Figure 4(b)). The older the firm, the less likely to have actually experience 
financing problems, while this is not true for firms who only perceived financing obstacles. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
This exercise makes us conclude that focusing on firms who perceive (but do not really experience) 
financing obstacles leads to a flawed, or at least misleading analysis, as the general belief of survey 
respondents appear to blur the overall picture. With this in mind, our analysis proves that, contrary to 
Ferrando and Griesshaber’s (2011) findings, not only youth but also firm size actually matters 
significantly in determining the probability to experience financing constraints, while ownership type and 
sector of economic activity actually do not. The lack of significance of the sector of economic activity in 
which the firms operates remains conspicuous and at odds with several empirical papers (see for example, 
Coluzzi et al., 2009). This could well be due to the widespread nature of the economic slowdown, as 
suggested in Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011). The rest of the paper will focus on the sole indicator of 
“experienced financing constraints”  and try to ascertain  in a more  robust fashion what their  main 
determinants were in 2009 and 2010.  
(d) Risk factors to experiencing financing obstacs: a panel estimation 
The release of a new wave of data in October 2010 opened up new possibilities for our analysis. The third 
wave of the SME survey focused on SMEs’ views during the period from March to September 2010.  
Using this additional wave of results and merging it with previous survey results into a panel allows to 
control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity which is known to be the main reason behind the risk 
of obtaining biased results in cross-section studies (e.g. Moulton, 1986). In our specific case, incorporating 
information related to both cross-section and time series variables can substantially diminish the problems 
that arise when there is an omitted variable. Moreover, the panel nature of the data provides an increased 
number of data points generating additional degrees of freedom which, presumably, leads to more efficient 
estimation.  
Our panel is, by construction, representative of the euro area across several dimensions i.e. firm size (i.e. 
about 90% of surveyed firms are SMEs), sectoral composition of the economy and country. About 16% of 
firms are less than 5 years old and more than 60% are more than 10 years old. The panel remains largely 
unbalanced, with only 378 firms having participated in all three surveys. Our specification is a static panel 
probit model, i.e. we do  not allow for a specific role for dynamics.  In fact,  we  assume the same 
relationship between the probability to experience financing obstacles and its determinants described in 
the previous section, but this time, with determinants that vary both across firms and time i.e. 
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As in the previous section, probabilities of experiencing financing constraints conditional on our vector of 
explanatory variables can be estimated in a similar fashion i.e.: 
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Table 5 shows how our set of structural variables help predict the likelihood of experiencing external 
financing constraints using the full panel of data. As in the previous section, the first and second column 
only differ on the type of variable used to measure firm age: a categorical variable in the first case and a 
continuous variable in the second. The third column specification includes interaction variables.  
[Table 5 around here] 
As discussed earlier, the parameters of a probit model – like those of any non-linear model – should not be 
interpreted as marginal effects and the estimated coeffficients do not simply quantify the influence of 
model covariates on the probability of suffering financial constraints. Instead, marginal effects are a non-
linear combination of all regressors in the model. Hence we use model (3) to predict the probability of 
experiencing  financing  constraints  based on the marginal effect of relevant determinants, all other 
variables being left unchanged (see Table 6). Panel analysis results broadly confirm the picture of euro 
area firms under financing constraints provided in the previous section of this paper. The marginal effect 
of  firm  size  on  the likelihood to experience financing constraints is  linear and very similar to that 
suggested by the cross section analysis: the larger the firm the less likely to run into financing trouble. The 
probability for a micro firm to experience financing constraints reaches 23%, significantly higher from 
that of small (20%) and medium firms (17%). It should be stressed at this point, that the probability for  
large firms is estimated with greater imprecision, reflecting the relatively smaller sample of large firms. 
Firm age also appears as a robust predictor of the likelihood to experience financing constraint, although, 
using the full panel, there is no longer a significant difference between very young firms (aged less than 5 
years old) and firms aged between 5 and 10 years old. Clearly, however, firms below 10 years of age have 
a 25% chance of experiencing problems of access to finance, which significantly contrasts with only 
around 17% for firms of 20 years old and more. Sector remains insignificant with the notable exception of 
construction and real estate: firms operating in that sector of the economy tend to have a significantly 
higher propensity to run into financing trouble, which was not the case in the cross-section analysis of the 
second survey wave. This may be due to greater accuracy provided by the increased number of 
observations. Finally, as expected, country remains a strong determinant of problems of access to finance, 
with French firms having the smallest probability of being financially crunched (11%), significantly better 
off than German (15%), Italian (20%) and Spanish firms (34%). 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
Interaction terms also reveals interesting relationships (see Figure 5). For example, we find that while 
micro firms, on average, have a significantly higher probability to face financing obstacles (about 23%), 
this needs to be qualified. Indeed, older (above 20 years old)  micro firms have significantly less chance to 
run into financing trouble (around 20% chance) than younger ones (i.e. less than 10 years old, with around 
30% chance). The same is true for small firms, where younger firms appear significantly more prone to 
experiencing financing obstacles. The effect of age is less clear-cut for medium firms while the 
imprecision becomes important for large firms due to the small size of the available sample . 
[Figure 5 around here] 
 
(e) A country perspective 
Last, but not least, we run estimations to know whether the results obtained so far for the overall panel 
also stand at a national level. Table 7 displays estimations for a basic specification for the euro area as a 
whole and separately, for each of the main four member countries for which a representative sample is 
available.
8 The significance of the estimated parameters varies somehow across countries.  
[Table 7 around here] 
Looking first at the effect of firm size, we find that in general, the probability to experience financing 
constraints is significantly explained by size. Tests of the non-existence of a size effect (i.e. testing that all 
size dummies are equal) are rejected in all countries except Germany, where firm size does not seem to 
matter  much when  predicting  financing constraints.  However the magnitude  of the size effect varies 
substantially across countries. Partial tests on the equality of some coefficients show that in all countries – 
                                                       
8   The specification is similar to column (3) in table 3. However the interactions between firm age and firm size 
are not included due to the small number of observations in some cells, that making the estimation procedure either 
impossible or giving very unstable results.  
except for Spain – micro firms have a different coefficient to medium firms, in Italy micro firms parameter 
also differs from the one estimated for small firms. In Spain small and medium firms coefficient appear as 
significantly different. Moreover, surprisingly  enough, in  Italy, the predicted  probability of being 
financially constrained turns out to be significantly lower for small and medium firms than for large 
companies (the reference group).  
Once again, the impact of the different covariates on the dependent variable can be better understood by 
computing their marginal effects and predicting the probability to experience financing constraints, all 
other variables being constant (see Table 8). For example, German micro firms have a 20% risk of having 
a difficult access to finance, a risk decreasing with firm size as large firm have a 12% risk only
9. Spanish 
firms are those with the highest risk of facing financial constraints, at 36% for both micro and small firms, 
nearly doubling the probability estimated for their German counterparts.  
[Table 8 around here] 
Being a one-person or a family business appears to significantly hamper access to finance only in Spain. 
However, even in this case, the effect is not strong and the difference between the risks of facing financing 
constraints depending on the type of ownership is insignificant (around 31-35%). Once controlling for 
other covariates, one-person only or family business are generally not facing higher financing constraints 
than other types of firms (i.e. owned by public shareholders, by other firms, by venture capital companies, 
etc). 
Age remains a robust predictor of the unavailability of external funding for all countries. In all countries 
younger firms (and especially those of less than 5 years old) have a positive and significant coefficient 
with respect to oldest firms (reference group). Tests on the non-existence of an age effect (i.e. testing that 
all age dummies are equal) are strongly rejected for all countries. However, point estimates of the age 
dummies do not necessarily have a monotonic relationship with the dependent variable. For example, our 
estimates for Germany shows that the oldest age group (firms aged 50 years old and more) are not 
significantly different those aged between 10 and 20 years old but they are worse off than companies aged 
between 20 and 49 years old. This result is somehow difficult to explain
10. Once again, Table 8 offers a 
clearer reading of the predicted probabilities of experiencing financing constraints depending on the age 
variable. As expected, in all countries, younger firms (i.e. less than 10 years old) have a higher probability 
to experience financing constraints than their elders. In Spain, these firms have about a 40% probability to 
face financing obstacles compared with around 30% for the rest of firms. Similarly, in Germany, firms 
below 10 years of age have a 20% chance of being denied external financing compared with less than 15% 
for other firms. In France, however, only the very young (i.e. less than 5 years old) have a much higher 
probability (17%) of facing financing obstacles than the rest of firms (between 8 and 12%).  
                                                       
9 In statistical terms, however, only micro firms appear significantly worse off than others. 
10   We have run Wald tests on the equality of coefficients for age dummies. The only two cases which are not 
rejected are the null hypothesis of age above 50 equal to age between 10 and 19, and age 5 to 9 equal; to less 
than 5.   
Finally, our country analysis reveals interesting country differences regarding the impact of various 
sectors of economic activity. Testing for the overall significance of industrial sectors in country 
estimations, we found that sectors do not significantly explain financing constraints at all in Germany, but 
marginally do in France and strongly in both Italy and Spain. In particular, construction and real estate 
firms in Spain, and to a lesser extent in Italy, faced a much higher probability to experience financing 
constraints that any other firms (45% in Spain and 29% in Italy). This result does not come as a surprise 
given the uncertainties characterising construction and real estate developments since 2007. Also, French 
manufacturing firms have a relatively higher risk of experiencing financial constraints compared with the 
rest of the French economy, which is not seen in any other country. 
4.  Conclusion 
During the recent financial crisis, euro area firms, and especially SMEs, have been reporting acute 
problems of access to external finance. Using firm-level replies to the SME survey on access to finance 
between 2009 and 2010, we construct two indicators of financing constraints: one based on perceptions 
and another, based on actually experienced financing constraints. We then explore what can determine 
these two states: firm size, firm age, type of ownership, sector of economic activity or country. We find 
that perceptions of financial crunch was broadly based across firms but those firms who really experienced 
a credit crunch tended to be small and young, confirming the fact that SMEs tend to suffer more when 
credit standards are tightened. Some countries of the euro area also appear to have suffered significantly 
more (Spain) while others were much better off (France) in terms of access to finance. Looking forward 
and as a second step in our project, the panel structure of the survey where individual firms can be 
followed over time will provide a new dimension for research to be pursued. The dynamic panel should 
indeed allow us to estimate transition probabilities across states by following (the determinants of) firms’ 
performance in accessing finance along the different waves of the survey. 
  
Table 1 – Composition of the three first waves of the survey on access to finance of SMEs 
  WAVE 1  
(2009H1) 
 







  Nber of 
observations 










In % of 
total 
SIZE             
- micro (1 to 9 employees)  2504  41.1%  1546  29.6%  1601  30.1% 
- small (10 to 49 employees)  13934  31.7%  1621  30.5%  1673  31.5% 
- medium (50 to 249 employees)  1204  19.8%  1619  30.4%  1630  30.7% 
- large (+250 employees)  449  7.4%  534  10.0%  408  7.7% 
SECTORAL ACTIVITY       
     
- manufacturing, utilities, mining  1145  18.8%  1256  23.6%  1573  29.6% 
- construction and real estate  749  12.3%  697  13.1%  552  10.4% 
- wholesale and retail trade  1587  26.0%  1255  23.6%  1351  25.4% 
- transport 
2161  35.5% 
300  5.6%  267  5.0% 
- other services  1812  34.1%  1569  29.5% 
AGE OF THE FIRM       
     
- less than 5 years  1142  18.7%  1037  19.5%  725  14.7% 
- between 5 and 9 years  933  15.3%  743  14.0%  692  14.1% 
- between 10 and 19 years 
3717  61.0% 
921  17.3%  1203  24.5% 
- between 20 and 49 years  1588  29.8%  1759  35.8% 
- 50 years and more   610  11.5%  538  10.9% 
- DK/NA  299  4.9%  420  7.9%  395  7.4% 
COUNTRY       
     
- Germany  1003  16.5%  1001  18.8%  1000  18.8% 
- Spain  1012  16.6%  1004  18.8%  1000  18.8% 
- France  1000  16.4%  1001  18.8%  1003  18.8% 
- Italy  1006  16.5%  1004  18.8%  1000  18.8% 
- Other euro area countries  2070  34.0%  1310  24.8%  1309  24.8% 
OWNERSHIP       
     
- Shareholders (listed company)  564  9.3%  559  10.5%  248  4.7% 
- Family or entrepreneurs  3028  49.7%  2503  47.1%  2802  52.8% 
- Other firm or business associates  807  13.2%  851  16.0%  756  14.2% 
- Venture capital or business angel  80  1.3%  78  1.5%  86  1.6% 
- A natural person (self-employed)  1348  22.1%  1192  22.4%  1287  24.2% 
- Other, DK/NA  264  4.3%  137  2.6%  133  2.5% 
TOTAL  6091  100%  5320  100.0 
%- 
5312  100.0 
%- 




(a) Euro area firms’ more pressing problems faced in the previous six months  




































Regulation Other don't know
H1 2009 H2 2009 H1 2010
 
Source: EU-ECB SME survey on access to finance 
 
(b) Euro area firms’ more pressing problems faced in the previous six months by firm size 
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Source: EU-ECB SME survey on access to finance 




Euro area firms’ experience of constrained access 
to finance by firm size 
(in percentage of all responding firms; second half 
of 2009 
Euro area firms’ experience of constrained access 
to finance by firm age 































Source: EU-ECB SME survey on access to finance   
 
Table 2 
Alternative ways to define financial obstacles: perceptions versus reality 
 (in number of respondents) 
 
  Perceptions: Reports that access to finance is the main problem 
Reality: Has experienced 







NO  2,822  327  3,149 
YES  518  509  1,027 
- no answer  599  145  1,144 
Total  4,339  981  5,320 
  
Table 3 – Determinants of experiencing financing obstacles 
  Dependant variable: Experienced constrained 
access to finance 
2009H2 
Dependant variable: 
Perceived constrained access 
to finance 
2009H2 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






Micro firms  0.171  0.143 *  0.355  0.412  0.543 
Small firms  0.101  0.085  0.042 
 
0.214  0.329 
Medium firms  0.001  -0.028  0.063  0.245  0.204 
Ownership  0.097  0.112 *  0.136  0.152 
 
0.222 
Ownership*micro      -0.221***  -0.166  -0.283 
Ownership*small      -0.055  -0.011  0.003 
Ownership*medium      0.053  0.123  0.351 
Age (continuous)    -0.102 ***       
Age from 20 to 49   0.028    -0.132  0.033  0.325 *** 
Age from 10 to 19  0.131 *    0.427  0.411 ***  0.851 * 
Age from 5 to 9  0.240 **    -0.047  -0.028  0.454 
Age <5 years old  0.362 ***    1.077 **  0.956  **  2.303 ** 
Age [20 to 49] * micro firms      0.196  0.107  0.015 
Age [10 to 19] * micro firms      -0.242  -0.379  -0.727 
Age [5 to 9] * micro firms      0.305  0.149  -0.058 
Age <5  * micro firms      -0.737  -0.761  -1.83 
Age [20 to 49] * small firms      0.304  -0.089  -0.343 
Age [10 to 19] * small firms      -0.185  -0.264  ***  -0.47 
Age [5 to 9] * small firms      0.436  0.240  0.300 
Age <5  * small firms      -0.616  -0.554  -1.45 
Age [20 to 49] * medium       0.094  -0.245 ***  -0.551  ** 
Age  [10 to 19] * medium       -0.514  -0.339  **  -0.662 
Age [5 to 9]  * medium      0.204  0.368  0.416 
Age <5  * medium firms      -0.795  -0.730  -1.68 
Construction and real estate  0.063  0.040  0.066  0.056  0.289 
Wholesale and retail trade  -0.038  -0.054  -0.042  -0.002  0.083 
Transport  0.171  0.115  0.168  0.0.69  0.237 
Other services  0.025  0.009  0.026  -0.118  -0.127 
Spain  0.802 ***  0.789 ***  0.798  ***  0.555  ***  0.390  *** 
France  -0.228 ***  -0.279 ***  -0.230  ***  -0.309 ***  -0.841  *** 
Italy  0.351 ***  0.333 ***  0.341 ***  0.134 ***  -0.020 
Other euro area countries  0.277 ***  0.263 ***  0.277 ***  -0.186  ***  -0.399 *** 
constant  -1. 28 ***  -0.83 ***  -1.31 ***  -1.36 
*** 
-1.08 *** 
Pseudo R2  0.071  0.070  0.075  0.063  0.0584 
Nber of observations  3986  3730  3986  5063  5063 
Note: * corresponds to p<0.1; ** to p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
  
Figure 3 
(a) Average predicted probability of experiencing 
financing constraints by firm size 
(b) Average predicted probability of experiencing 
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(c) Average predicted probability of experiencing 
financing constraints by type of ownership 
(d) Average predicted probability of experiencing 
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(f) Average predicted probability of experiencing financing constraints by type of ownership 
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Table 4 –  Factor change scale relative to baseline category “Not perceiving nor experiencing 
financing obstacles” (odd-ratios) 
  Alternative  Odds-ratio (e^b)  P>|z| 
SIZE       
Micro firms  Constrained  2.0873  0.000 
Small firms  Constrained  1.1441  0.004 
AGE       
10 to 19 years old  Perceived  3.7128  0.019 
Less than 5 years old  Constrained  6.5609  0.000 
INTERACTIONS       
Micro firms – Less than 5 years old  Constrained  3.8047  0.012 
Medium firms – 20 to 49 years old  Perceived  0.2232  0.000 
Medium firms – 10 to 19 years old  Perceived  0.3518  0.029 
Medium firms – Less than 5 years old  Constrained  0.2480  0.000 
SECTOR       
Other services  Constrained  1.1916  0.008 
COUNTRY       
Italy  Perceived  0.7309  0.037 
Other euro area countries  Perceived  2.3882  0.000 
  Constrained  4.2735  0.000 
Note: Constrained stands for category “Experienced financing obstacles” and Perceived stands for category “Only 
perceived financing obstacles” 
  
Figure 4 – Model predictions of experiencing, perceiving or not financial obstacles 
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Table 5 – Determinants of experiencing financing obstacles  
  Dependant variable: Experienced constrained access to finance 
Unbalanced panel of three survey rounds 2009H1, 2009H2 and 2010Q2-Q3 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Micro firms  0.190 ***  0.196 ***  0.237 *** 
Small firms  0.092 *  0.074  0.238 * 
Medium firms  -0.033  -0.072  -0.005 
Ownership  0.063 *  0.056 *  0.118 
Ownership*micro      -0.146 
Ownership*small      -0.081 
Ownership*medium      0.016 
Age (continuous)    -0.003 ***   
Age from 20 to 49   -0.007    -0.022 
Age from 10 to 19  0.076 *    0.200 
Age from 5 to 9  0.279 ***    0.238 
Age <5 years old  0.306 ***    0.648 *** 
Age from 20 to 49  * micro firms      0.119 
Age from 10 to 19  * micro firms      0.001 
Age from 5 to 9  * micro firms      0.162 
Age <5  * micro firms      -0.264 
Age from 20 to 49  * small firms      -0.044 
Age from 10 to 19  * small firms      -0.233 
Age from 5 to 9  * small firms      -0.007 
Age <5  * small firms      -0.412 ** 
Age from 20 to 49  * medium firms      0.012 
Age from 10 to 19  * medium firms      -0.139 
Age from 5 to 9  * medium firms      -0.036 
Age <5  * medium firms      -0.317 
Construction and real estate  0.136 ***  0.162 ***  0.138 *** 
Wholesale and retail trade  -0.001  0.011  0.000 
Transport  0.100  0.084  0.102 
Other services  -0.044  -0.027  -0.044 
Spain  0.625 ***  0.597 ***  0.622 *** 
France  -0.171 ***  -0.160 ***  -0.176 *** 
Italy  0.198 ***  0.201 ***  0.195 *** 
Other euro area countries  0.210 ***  0.199 ***  0.211 *** 
constant  -1.280 ***  -1.082 ***  -1.341 *** 
       
Nber of observations  12,609  12,084  12,609 
Wald test [p-value]  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: * corresponds to p<0.1; ** to p<0.05 and *** p<0.01.  




One person or family business 0.21 0.00 48.44 0.000 0.20 0.22
Other 0.20 0.01 23.94 0.000 0.18 0.21
FIRM SIZE
micro 0.23 0.01 29.54 0.000 0.22 0.25
small 0.20 0.01 31.31 0.000 0.19 0.22
medium 0.17 0.01 23.36 0.000 0.16 0.19
large 0.20 0.02 11.26 0.000 0.16 0.23
FIRM AGE
>= 50 years old 0.17 0.01 18.70 0.000 0.15 0.19
20 to 49 years old 0.17 0.01 26.50 0.000 0.16 0.19
10 to 19 years old 0.19 0.01 25.74 0.000 0.18 0.21
5 to 9 years old 0.25 0.01 22.69 0.000 0.23 0.27
<5 years old 0.27 0.01 22.75 0.000 0.25 0.29
SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Manufacturing 0.20 0.01 26.94 0.000 0.19 0.21
Construction and real estate 0.24 0.01 22.64 0.000 0.22 0.26
Retail trade 0.20 0.01 27.77 0.000 0.19 0.21
Transport 0.23 0.02 12.96 0.000 0.19 0.26
Other services 0.19 0.01 30.75 0.000 0.18 0.20
COUNTRY
Germany 0.15 0.01 19.80 0.000 0.14 0.17
Spain 0.34 0.01 32.60 0.000 0.32 0.36
France 0.12 0.01 16.74 0.000 0.10 0.13
Italy 0.20 0.01 22.44 0.000 0.19 0.22







Figure 5 – Effect of interaction between firm size and age on the predicted probability to experience 
financing constraints 
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Table 7 – Panel estimation results by country 
  Euro area  Germany  Spain  France  Italy 
Micro firms  0.292 ***  0.408  0.476 **  0.442 *  0.052 
Small firms  0.132  0.013  0.475 ***  0.177  -0.384 * 
Medium firms  -0.060  -0.132  0.249  -0.062  -0.341 * 
Ownership  0.104  -0.027  0.393 *  -0.096  -0.054 
Family * micro firms  -0.136  -0.064  -0.360  0.046  -0.144 
Family * small firms  -0.067  0.091  -0.346  0.186  0.209 
Family * medium firms  0.031  0.218  -0.218  0.246  0.093 
Age from 20 to 49   -0.006  -0.239 **  0.171 *  -0.149  0.016 
Age from 10 to 19  0.077 *  0.000  0.198 *  -0.010  -0.044 
Age from 5 to 9  0.280 ***  0.220 **  0.526 ***  0.052  0.319 ** 
Age <5 years old  0.308 ***  0.265 **  0.362 ***  0.277 **  0.375 *** 
Construc. & real estate  0.136 ***  0.049  0.305 ***  -0.270 **  0.370 *** 
Wholesale/retail trade  -0.002  -0.031  -0.068  -0.233 **  0.010 
Transport  0.099  0.052  0.119  -0.254  0.339 ** 
Other services  -0.044  -0.014  -0.094  -0.199 **  0.149 ** 
constant  -1.298 ***  -1.189 ***  -1.105 ***  -1.281 ***  -0.837 *** 
Nber of observations  12,609  2,427  2,324  2,419  2,132 
Wald test [p-value]  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: * corresponds to p<0.1; ** to p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
  
Table 8 – Predicted probability of experiencing financing constraints by country 
Pr.   Std. err (*) Pr.   Std. err (*) Pr.   Std. err (*) Pr.   Std. err (*)
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
One person or family business 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.35 0.01
Other 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.31 0.02
FIRM SIZE
micro 0.20 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.36 0.02
small 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.36 0.02
medium 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.31 0.02
large 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.26 0.05 0.28 0.04
FIRM AGE
>= 50 years old 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.26 0.03
20 to 49 years old 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.31 0.02
10 to 19 years old 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.32 0.02
5 to 9 years old 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.45 0.03
<5 years old 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.38 0.03
SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Manufacturing 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.33 0.02
Construction and real estate 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.45 0.03
Retail trade 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.31 0.02
Transport 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.38 0.05
Other services 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.30 0.02
(*) delta method 
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Annex I – Spread between interest rates charged in small loans (i.e. less than 1 EUR million) and 
large loans (i.e. less than EUR million) 















Annex II – Description of main variables 
 
Variable  Based on the question:   Value taken by the variable 
DEPENDANT VARIABLES     
Perceived financing 
constraints 
TO ALL FIRMS: Question Q0 of SME survey 
questionnaire: “what is currently the most 
pressing problem your firm is facing?” 
[1] Finding customers 
[2] Competition 
[3] Access to finance 
[4] Cost of production or labour 






1 = Access to finance is the most pressing 
problem [=3] 




Ways of financing: 
-  Bank overdraft, credit line or credit card 
overdraft 
-  Bank loan (new or renewal; excl. 
overdrafts and credit lines) 
-  Trade credit 
-  Other external financing (e.g. debt 
securities issuance, equity, etc.) 
 
TO ALL FIRMS: 
Question 7A. For each of the above ways of 
financing and over the past 6 months, 
could you indicate whether you: 
[1] applied 
[2] did not apply because of possible 
rejection 
[3] did not apply because of sufficient 
internal funds 
[4] did not apply for other reasons 
[5] don’t know / not applicable 
 
Question 7B. If you applied and tried to 
negotiate for this type of financing over the 
past 6 months, did you: 
[1] applied and got everything 
[2] applied and got most of it (i.e. more 
than 75%] 
[3] applied and got only a limited part of it 
[less than 75%] 
[4] Applied but refused because the cost 
was too high 
[5] Applied but was rejected 




1 = replied [2] to Q7A or [3], [4] or [5] to Q7B 
0 = did not replied to [2] to Q7A or [3], [4] or [5] 
to Q7B  
 
Financing obstacle  Based on Q0, Q7A and Q7B (see above) 
 
 
0 = [Perceived financing constraints = 0] AND 
[Experienced financing constraints = 0] 
1 = [Perceived financing constraints = 1] AND 
[Experienced financing constraints = 0] 




   
Firm ownership   QD6. “Who are the owners of your firm?”  0 = Public shareholders, other firms, venture 
capital and other 
1 = Family or one-owner only firm 
Firm age 
(reference group used in 
the estimation: more 
than 50 years old) 
QD5. “In which year was your firm 
registered?” 
 
Firm age = Year of survey – year of 
founding (also used in log) 
1 = Less than 5 years old 
2 = Aged between 5 and 9 years old 
3 = Aged between 10 and 19 years old 
4 = Aged between 20 and 49 years old 
5 = Aged more than 50 years old 
Firm size  
(reference group used in 
the estimation: large 
firms) 
QD1. “How many persons does your 
company currently employ in full-time or 
part-time in [YOUR COUNTRY] at all 
locations?”” 
1 = Micro firm (less than 10 employees) 
2 = Small firms (between 10 and 49 employees) 
3 = Medium firms (between 50 and 249 
employees) 
4 = Large firms (more than 250 employees) 
Sector  
(reference group used in 
the estimation: mining 
and manufacturing) 




[3] Manufacturing (incl. utilities) 
[4] Wholesale and retail trade 
[5] Transport and communications 
[6] Real estate 
[7] Other services to businesses and 
persons 
(Agriculture, financial and public services 
are excluded) 
1 = Mining and manufacturing [1+3] 
2 = Construction and real estate [2+6] 
3 = Retail and wholesale trade [6] 
4 = Transport and communications [5] 
5 = Other services [7] 
Country dummies 
(reference country used 
in the estimation: 
Germany 
Assigned by the interviewer  4 = Germany 
5 = Spain 
7 = France 
10=  Italy 
99 = Other euro area country 
 
  
Annex 3 – Full panel composition 
The table on the right shows the distribution of 
firms across survey rounds I, II and III. For 
example, there were 5312 companiers participating 
in round III, of those 3544 participated in round 3 
only, 1399 participated both in round II and round 
III, and 378 in all three survey rounds. 
 
Number of firms participating in:     
- Only survey round I  5,125  36.6% 
- Only survey round II  2,964  21.2% 
- Only survey round III  3,544  25.3% 
- Survey rounds I and II  588  4.2% 
- Survey rounds II and III  1,390  9.9% 
- All survey rounds  378  2.7% 
TOTAL  13,989  100.0% 
 
 
Table – Composition of the full panel 
  Nb. of 
observations 
In % of 
total 
SIZE     
- micro (1 to 9 employees)  5652  33.8 
- small (10 to 49 employees)  5229  31.3 
- medium (50 to 249 employees)  4453  26.6 
- large (+250 employees)  1389  8.3 
SECTORAL ACTIVITY     
- manufacturing, utilities, mining  4155  24.9 
- construction and real estate  2101  12.6 
- wholesale and retail trade  4274  25.6 
- transport  768  4.6 
- other services  5425  32.4 
AGE OF THE FIRM     
- less than 5 years  2693  16.1 
- between 5 and 9 years  2232  13.3 
- between 10 and 19 years  3745  22.4 
- between 20 and 49 years  4986  39.8 
- 50 years and more   2627  15.7 
- DN/NA  440  2.6 
COUNTRY     
- Germany  3004  18.0 
- Spain  3016  18.0 
- France  3004  18.0 
- Italy  3010  18.0 
- Other euro area countries  4689  28.0 
OWNERSHIP     
- Shareholders (listed company)  1287  7.7 
- Family or entrepreneurs  8217  49.1 
- Other firm or business associates  2330  13.9 
- Venture capital or business angel  226  1.4 
- A natural person (self-employed)  3827  22.9 
- Other, DK/NA  836  5.0 
TOTAL  16723  100 





Note that if all firms 13.989 firms were 
observed in all three rounds, we should have 
41967 observations (= 13.989*3). What we 
really have are 16723 observations, because as 
seen in the previous table the number of 
companies cooperating in more than one round 
are not many. 
 